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Note
AGENTS OF CHANGE: THE FIDUCIARY
DUTIES OF FORWARDING MARKET
PROFESSIONALS
PETER D. ISAKOFF†
They’re not afraid because other than Bernie Madoff, when was the
last time someone on Wall Street faced any real
punishment? . . . Sure, a few go to jail once in a while, but they’re
usually out in a few months and then on the speaking circuit. That’s
not exactly a deterrent against bad behavior that’s making you
millions.
1
– Matt Taibbi
[I]nnovation creates challenges . . . .
It can foster incredibly complex financial products that fail to live
up to buyers’ expectations, but generate fees for their creators and
sellers. This complexity can bury important information needed for
effective decision-making, so that even the most sophisticated are
unable to make informed judgments about risk and payoff. Finally,
it can mask old-fashioned manipulation and fraud. But whether
innovation is used for good or ill, to improve the system or to
manipulate it—it creates a challenge for regulators . . . to keep up
with the industries they regulate.
– Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Mary
2
Schapiro
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ABSTRACT
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, the legal system struggles
to effectively regulate forwarding market professionals—brokerdealers and investment advisers who invest client funds with third
parties. Defining the fiduciary duties these forwarding market
professionals owe their clients when they invest funds with third
parties raises complex issues concerning due diligence, postinvestment
monitoring of investments, and disclosure of material facts. Weak
regulatory standards, advances in technology in the financial-services
industry, and changes in the scope of services provided by brokerdealers emphasize both the inadequacies of the system created by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934) Act and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA) and the urgent need for a new regulatory
standard. This Note contends that agency law provides a clear
framework for defining the fiduciary duties that forwarding market
professionals owe their clients for third-party investments. It then
explains how the SEC is well situated to establish a fiduciary duty for
forwarding market professionals based on agency principles under
the Dodd-Frank Act.

INTRODUCTION
For decades, Bernie Madoff operated a Ponzi scheme,
manipulating almost $65 billion in financial investments to create a
3
facade of profitability. Although Madoff engaged in blatantly
4
criminal activity and was appropriately prosecuted, the legal system
struggles to regulate forwarding market professionals—broker5
dealers and investment advisers who invest client funds with third
parties such as Madoff. As of 2012, regulations did not usually impose
fiduciary duties on broker-dealers and only nebulously described the
6
fiduciary duties that investment advisers owe their clients. Scandals
3. Frances Romero, Bernie Madoff Scandal: Where Are They Now?, TIME (Mar. 12,
2010), http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1971588_1971589_1971575,00
.html.
4. See generally The Madoff Case: A Timeline, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2009), http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB112966954231272304.html (providing a timeline of the events of the Madoff
Ponzi scheme).
5. Throughout this Note, the terms “broker-dealers” and “investment advisers” generally
reference financial institutions. Individual broker-dealers and investment advisers exist, but they
often work for these larger financial institutions.
6. Under the framework created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat.
881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2006)), and the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 (IAA), ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21
(2006)), broker-dealers need only make recommendations that are “suitable” to their clients.
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such as Madoff’s investment scheme highlighted the need for more
stringent regulatory standards, including heightened duties of due
diligence and postinvestment monitoring, for forwarding market
professionals. In this regard, the economic crisis of 2008 has presented
lawmakers, administrative agencies, and jurists with new regulatory
7
challenges.
In the aftermath of the Madoff scandal, regulators such as
Massachusetts Secretary of State William Galvin focused their
attention on the broker-dealers and investment advisers who invested
8
client funds with Madoff. Regulators, for example, have targeted
Fairfield Greenwich Group (FGG), which allegedly received
coaching from Madoff to avoid Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) inquiries and had possessed at least constructive knowledge—
9
if not actual knowledge—of Madoff’s illegal Ponzi scheme. Despite
Madoff’s suspect activities at the time, FGG did not notify its clients
10
that it had invested their funds with Madoff. Because the duediligence standards created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
11
12
(1934 Act) and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA) did not
clearly require FGG to report Madoff’s activities to clients, FGG was
able to settle pending claims against it without admitting any
13
wrongdoing.
Similarly, investment adviser J. Ezra Merkin, the head of the
hedge fund Gabriel Capital Corporation, moved $2.4 billion of client
Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers—What’s in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31,
36 (2005). Broker-dealers are excluded from regulation under the IAA as long as the advice
they provide to clients is “solely incidental” to their brokerage services and they receive no
“special compensation” for the advice. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2006); see also infra Part I.
7. See generally Douglas J. Elliott, Some Thoughts on US Financial Reforms, BROOKINGS
(Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2010/1201_europe_economics/
elliott_working_paper.pdf (describing recent regulatory developments in response to the
financial crisis).
8. Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Mass. Regulator Will Not Settle Madoff Feeder Suit, REUTERS,
Aug. 14, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57D3X820090814 (“Galvin’s
office is particularly interested in finding people who invested indirectly with Madoff by putting
their money into funds that ultimately handed the cash to his firm . . . .”).
9. Beth Healy, Galvin Won’t Settle Madoff Case, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 14, 2009, at B7.
10. Herbst-Bayliss, supra note 8.
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a–78mm (2006)).
12. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2006)).
13. In re Fairfield Greenwich Advisors LLC, No. 2009-0028, 2009 WL 3157459, at *1
(Mass. Sec. Div. Sept. 8, 2009).
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funds into Madoff’s investment scheme without his clients’
14
knowledge. By ignoring warnings that Madoff’s profits were “too
15
good to be true,” Merkin failed to act in his clients’ best interests
when he neglected to perform adequate due diligence and disclose his
16
investment decisions to his clients. Although prosecutors have
generally recognized the existence of some fiduciary duty to clients in
17
these cases, regulations under the 1934 Act and the IAA offer
limited guidance as to the extent of forwarding market professionals’
duties.
Financial-services regulation has long merited attention and
18
attempts at reform, and the Madoff scandal underscored the need
19
for a new regulatory standard. By raising issues about whether and
to what extent due diligence, postinvestment monitoring of
20
investments, and disclosure of material facts are required, the
Madoff scandal highlighted the particularly difficult problem of
defining the fiduciary duties that broker-dealers and investment
advisers owe their clients when investing funds with third parties.
Technological advances in the financial-services industry and changes
in the scope of services provided by broker-dealers have revealed
both the inadequacies of the system created by the 1934 Act and the
21
IAA and the need for a harmonized regulatory standard. Although

14. Martha Graybow, Merkin Charged with Civil Fraud in Madoff Case, REUTERS, Apr. 6,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE53548420090406.
15. Id.
16. See id. (“New York University and other investors also have sued Merkin, saying he
put their money with Madoff without their consent.”).
17. See, e.g., Robert Chew, Madoff Feeder Merkin Charged by Cuomo, TIME (Apr. 6,
2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1889740,00.html (“In total, Merkin is
charged with 720 breaches of fiduciary duty in raising, through social and charitable
connections, over $4 billion, which he turned over to third-party money managers, like
Madoff.”).
18. For instance, in 2005, the SEC allowed broker-dealers to charge asset-based fees and
still avoid regulation as investment advisers in certain circumstances. Certain Broker-Dealers
Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release No. 51523, Advisers Act
Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424 (Apr. 12, 2005). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit vacated the SEC’s new rule in 2007. Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC,
482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of BrokerDealers and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 398 (2010) (discussing this sequence of
events).
19. See Elliott, supra note 7, at 7 (“I believe that the legislative and regulatory changes do
considerably more good than harm and are of real value . . . .”).
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
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scholars have contemplated certain regulatory changes, such as
23
eliminating the broker-dealer exclusion in the IAA, such suggestions
24
presuppose a division between brokerage and advisory services that
does not reflect actual developments in the financial-services market.
In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
25
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Congress created the opportunity
to reform in the financial-services industry by giving the SEC
discretion to establish a new framework of forwarding market
26
professionals’ fiduciary duties. Specifically, section 913(g) of the
Dodd-Frank Act allows the SEC, after a six-month study period, to
recognize a new fiduciary duty for broker-dealers and investment
27
advisers. The SEC, after conducting such a study, described the need
for a new heightened fiduciary duty, but it has yet to articulate the
28
contours of that duty. This Note proposes an innovative approach to
the regulation of forwarding market professionals by applying agency
principles to create the new framework. Agency law provides a strong
conception of the duties of due diligence and postinvestment
monitoring that forwarding market professionals owe their clients and
would remedy deficiencies in the regulatory structure created by the
1934 Act and the IAA. Regardless of the statutory distinctions
between broker-dealers and investment advisers, these financial
institutions owe their clients fiduciary duties clearly defined in agency
law when they invest funds with third parties.
Part I of this Note explores the fiduciary duties that forwarding
market professionals owe their clients for third-party investments
under case law, the 1934 Act, and the IAA, and argues for a revised
fiduciary standard. It first provides a brief regulatory history of
broker-dealers and investment advisers. It then describes the low bar
set by the “suitability” standard for broker-dealers and explains how,
22. See, e.g., Black, supra note 6, at 54–55 (arguing that broker-dealers should be
prohibited from holding themselves out as advisers and that their obligations should be
expanded if they hold themselves out as more than broker-dealers); Laby, supra note 18, at 399
(proposing the harmonization of regulations of investment advisers and broker-dealers because
such individuals no longer offer different services).
23. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2006).
24. See infra Part I.
25. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
26. See infra notes 202–11 and accompanying text.
27. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g), 124 Stat. at
1828–29 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k)–(l), 80b-11(g)–(h)) (Supp. IV 2010).
28. See infra notes 206–08 and accompanying text.
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even when a fiduciary duty is established for forwarding market
professionals, the applicable framework promotes silence instead of
an affirmative duty of care toward clients. Part II of this Note
discusses the general application of agency principles to the financialservices industry and describes how broker-dealers and investment
advisers form agency relationships with their clients. Part III then
articulates the clearly defined fiduciary duties these forwarding
market professionals would owe their clients under an agency-law
framework and outlines how these duties could have been applied to
forwarding market professionals involved in the Madoff scandal.
I. THE INADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO CLIENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF
THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS UNDER THE 1934 ACT AND THE IAA
The system of obligations and fiduciary duties for broker-dealers
and investment advisers created by the 1934 Act and the IAA does
not adequately protect clients from abuse. Section A of this Part
provides a brief history of the regulatory framework governing
broker-dealers and investment advisers. Section B then describes the
sources of the obligations that broker-dealers have toward their
clients with respect to funds managed by third parties. Lastly, Section
C argues that even when a fiduciary duty is established for investment
advisers under the framework created by the 1934 Act and the IAA,
it promotes silence on the part of forwarding market professionals
and does not effectively define the affirmative duties that these
professionals owe their clients in the context of third-party
investments.
A. Implications of the Historical Divide Between Broker-Dealers and
Investment Advisers
The regulatory history of broker-dealers and investment advisers
explains the complex and indeterminate fiduciary duties that these
forwarding market professionals have traditionally owed their clients.
The 1934 Act defines brokers as persons “engaged in the business of
29
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.” The
30
1938 Maloney Act amendments to the 1934 Act established a system

29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2006).
30. Maloney Act, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o–3
(2006)) (adding section 15A to the 1934 Act).
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of self-regulation for broker-dealers through the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD), an organization whose functions
would later be assumed by the Financial Industry Regulatory
31
Authority (FINRA).
Investment advisers occupy a different market niche. The IAA
defines an investment adviser as “any person who, for compensation,
engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the
32
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities.” Rather
than provide transactional brokerage services like those supplied by
broker-dealers, investment advisers offer continuous financial advice
to clients and are compensated separately for their services.
Investment advisers charge an asset-based fee for continued
33
discretionary management of investments. Broker-dealers generally
34
charge commission-based fees for their services, although some
35
broker-dealers also provide advisory services for a separate fee.
36
The IAA, which establishes a broker-dealer exclusion, further
sharpens the distinction between investment advisers and brokerdealers. This exclusion prevents regulation of broker-dealers under
the IAA if the advice provided by such professionals is “solely
incidental” to brokerage services and if the broker-dealers do not
37
receive “special compensation” for the advice. An examination of
congressional intent sheds light on the rationale for excluding brokerdealers from regulation under the IAA: because broker-dealers were
already regulated under the 1934 Act, Congress likely did not intend
38
the IAA to apply to institutions already facing federal regulation.
31. Maloney Act, 52 Stat. at 1070 (“Any association of brokers or dealers may be
registered with the Commission as a national securities association pursuant to [the
requirements of the Maloney Act and the SEC]. . . .”); see also Stephen J. Nelson, Commentary:
A Gap in Regulation of the OTC Markets, TRADERS MAG. (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.traders
magazine.com/news/otc-markets-finra-corporate-actions-104993-1.html (“To correct this
oversight, Congress created Section 15A of the Exchange Act in 1938, which instituted
something called a ‘national securities association.’ The National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., FINRA’s predecessor, was established in 1939.” (quoting Maloney Act, 52 Stat. at
1070)).
32. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006).
33. Id. (defining the scope of investment advisers’ activities).
34. Laby, supra note 18, at 400.
35. Id. at 401.
36. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C).
37. Id.; Laby, supra note 18, at 403.
38. See Black, supra note 6, at 41 (“In the SEC’s view, the congressional intent behind the
IAA was to regulate as investment advisers those persons whose activities were not already
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Nevertheless, an earlier draft of the IAA did not explicitly exclude
39
broker-dealers from coverage, and the exclusion was added later
40
without commentary. Although this exclusion made sense in an era
when broker-dealers provided a significant transactional service,
technological advances since the drafting of the 1934 Act and the
41
IAA have rendered this reasoning outdated.
Although broker-dealers and investment advisers have
historically operated under this dichotomous framework, subsequent
legislative action has recognized the need for reform. The Dodd42
Frank Act, passed on July 21, 2010, presents an apt opportunity for
the SEC to establish a new framework of fiduciary duties for financial
institutions.
B. The Limited Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers
As of 2012, regulations only weakly defined the duties that
broker-dealers and investment advisers owe their clients. Brokerdealers generally have no fiduciary duties to their clients, and the
fiduciary duties of investment advisers do not adequately establish
the level of due diligence required for third-party investments.

subject to federal securities regulation. Since broker-dealers were already regulated under the
[1934 Act], Congress carved out an exclusion to permit broker-dealers to provide investment
advice to their brokerage customers without subjecting them to additional regulation.”
(footnote omitted)).
39. S. 3580, 76th Cong. § 45(a)(16) (1940); see also Black, supra note 6, at 41–42 (describing
the ambiguous legislative history surrounding the broker-dealer exclusion).
40. S. 4108, 76th Cong. § 22(a)(11) (1940); H.R. 10065, 76th Cong. § 202(a)(11) (1940); see
also Black, supra note 6, at 42 (“In this version, Title II had its own definitional section and its
own definition of ‘investment adviser’ that included the broker exclusion. There was no
commentary explaining the addition.” (footnote omitted)).
41. See Laby, supra note 18, at 412 (“Changes in securities trading brought about by
changes in technology have rendered brokerage a commodity, which no longer entails the level
of judgment and skill required to conduct brokerage services in the bygone era of the early
twentieth century.”); see also id. at 404 (“The tidy separation between brokers and advisers
began to crumble initially in the 1980s when brokers started to offer financial planning services,
and more significantly in the 1990s when brokerage firms began to use titles such as ‘adviser’ or
‘financial adviser’ for their broker-dealer registered representatives and even encouraged
customers to think of the registered representative more as an adviser than a
stockbroker. . . . [U]se of such labels should put one on notice that the advice is no longer ‘solely
incidental’ to brokerage. Regulators, however, did not respond to this marketing move, and the
broker-dealer exclusion continued to separate brokers from advisers.”).
42. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
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1. Broker-Dealers. Under the system created by the 1934 Act
and the IAA, broker-dealers must adhere to a mere suitability
standard, which requires only that broker-dealers provide
43
recommendations for investments that meet clients’ specific needs.
Unless broker-dealers have advisory discretion over a client’s
investments, they are not bound by fiduciary duties and thus have no
44
further obligations to their clients beyond the point of sale.
Therefore, broker-dealers generally do not have a duty to monitor
45
client investments after an initial transaction.
Because broker-dealers usually have no fiduciary duties to their
clients under the 1934 Act and its related regulations, they can
proceed with self-dealing transactions as long as the transactions are
46
also suitable for their clients and they disclose the self-dealing to
47
their clients. Although this system facilitates broker-dealers’ acting
48
as principals in transactions with their clients, it also opens the field
to abusive practices. For example, under the suitability standard,
broker-dealers are not obligated to recommend the best possible
investment option for their clients or to act in their clients’ best
49
interests. The potential for abuse under such a standard is made
even greater by the fact that the requirement to disclose self-dealing
50
has been narrowly interpreted by courts. For instance, in Shivangi v.

43. See Black, supra note 6, at 36 (“When making a recommendation to purchase a
security, broker-dealers have obligations to make only recommendations that are suitable for
the customer, based on the customer’s financial situation and financial objectives.”).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 36–37.
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (2011).
48. Because broker-dealers do not usually establish a fiduciary relationship with their
clients under the framework set up by the 1934 Act and the IAA, they can engage in self-dealing
by selling securities to clients from their own accounts as principals. See Laby, supra note 18, at
407 (“Particularly in non-discretionary accounts, brokers are not typically considered
fiduciaries. Notwithstanding the prospect of owing fiduciary obligations, the primary reason
many brokers oppose application of the Advisers Act is due to restrictions on conducting
principal transactions imposed on advisers but not brokers.” (footnote omitted)).
49. See David Serchuk, Suitability: Where Brokers Fail, FORBES (June 24, 2009, 6:00 AM
EDT),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/23/suitability-standards-fiduciary-intelligent-investingbrokers.html (“Your stock broker or investment adviser could be a straight arrow, scouring the
financial world for the very best products, but it’s entirely likely they aren’t. They could just as
easily push you into ‘house’ products that help them reap better commissions. The fact is, the
latter situation is far from uncommon as brokers are typically not legally bound to find the ‘best’
products for you, merely ones that are considered ‘suitable.’”).
50. See, e.g., Benzon v. Morgan Stanley, No. 3:03-0159, 2004 WL 62747, at *1, *4 (M.D.
Tenn. Jan. 8, 2004) (dismissing claims brought against Morgan Stanley for its failure to disclose
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51

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Fifth Circuit declined to hold the
defendant brokerage firm liable for “failing to disclose that [its]
account executives receive[d] higher compensation for principal
trades of over-the-counter stocks in which Dean Witter [was] a
52
market maker than for other sales.” Critically, the court determined
53
that the brokerage firm had not intended to deceive its clients.
Even when broker-dealers have fiduciary duties because they
take on an advisory role, the framework provided by the 1934 Act
and the IAA does not adequately define such duties in a postsale
54
context. The IAA, which regulates broker-dealers who do not meet
55
the criteria for the broker-dealer exclusion, fails to elaborate on
postinvestment fiduciary duties.
2. Investment Advisers.
Unlike broker-dealers, investment
advisers have broad fiduciary duties to their clients under the IAA,
56
57
related regulations, and relevant case law. These fiduciary duties

the allocations and incentives it had given to employees to sell certain investments); Castillo v.
Dean Witter Discover & Co., No. 97 Civ. 1272(RPP), 1998 WL 342050, at *9, *11 (S.D.N.Y.
June 25, 1998) (holding that a brokerage firm was not liable for failing to disclose that its
“brokers [had] received more compensation in conjunction with the sale of Dean Witter
proprietary products than in conjunction with the sale of other products”); Black, supra note 6,
at 37 (“Courts, however, have not held firms liable for failing to disclose that the firm’s
compensation system may give account executives incentives to sell particular securities.”).
51. Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1987).
52. Id. at 886.
53. See id. at 889 (“The record supports the district court’s finding of no actual intent to
deceive. The record contains no evidence that Aitken or Dean Witter actually intended to
deceive the Shivangis by failing to disclose the compensation information, nor does it establish
that Aitken recommended the stock because of his unusual compensation. Rather, Aitken
recommended Keldon Oil stock because Dean Witter’s best analyst considered it a good
investment.”). If a client asks for investment advice and broker-dealers provide false or
misleading information, the broker-dealers may be liable for fraud, but this liability does not
arise from fiduciary duties. Black, supra note 6, at 36.
54. See infra Part I.B.2.
55. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
56. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7 (2011) (“If you are an investment adviser registered or
required to be registered under section 203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C.
80b-3), it shall be unlawful within the meaning of section 206 of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80b-6) for
you to provide investment advice to clients unless you: (a) . . . . Adopt and implement written
policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violation, by you and your supervised
persons, of the Act and the rules that the Commission has adopted under the Act . . . .”). When
claims arise against investment advisers, plaintiffs often use Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011), see, e.g., IDS Bond Fund, Inc. v. Gleacher
NatWest Inc., [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 91,471, ¶ 96,826 (D. Minn.
May 1, 2001) (holding that a failure to disclose to clients material facts relating to an investment
constituted a Rule 10b-5 violation).
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arise from investment advisers’ advisory role and nominally
58
encompass both initial investments and postinvestment monitoring.
Investment advisers must obtain written prior consent from clients
before initiating self-dealing transactions and must also advise clients
59
of potential conflicts of interest. Despite these safeguards, the
fiduciary duties of investment advisers pose serious implementation
problems and are not adequately defined in the postinvestment
context.
For instance, although investment advisers must perform some
initial due diligence, the degree of that due diligence and the extent to
which investment advisers must disclose their findings to clients are
unclear. Generally, due diligence “in the corporate finance
context . . . refer[s] to the process of investigating a company’s
business, legal and financial affairs in preparation for a possible
60
transaction.” Nonetheless, the specific due-diligence requirements
for potential investments with third parties are ambiguous and may
61
vary greatly. Given such variance, investment advisers often
negotiate due-diligence measures with their clients as a matter of
62
contract.
Due diligence can entail “perform[ing] a sensitivity analysis to
determine the key drivers and risk factors for [a] business,”
“review[ing] [a] company’s capital expenditure plans (for
maintenance and for growth),” “compar[ing] [a] company’s key
financial statistics with the statistics of competitors,” and

57. E.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (“The
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate
fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship.’” (quoting 2 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1412 (2d ed. 1961)); see also Black, supra note 6, at 38 (“It is well established that
the relationship between an investment adviser and his customer is a fiduciary one.”).
58. See Black, supra note 6, at 38 (“[W]here the investment adviser’s duties include
management of the account, he is under an obligation to monitor the performance of the
account to make appropriate changes in the portfolio.”).
59. Id.
60. John J. Clarke, Jr. & Lisa Firenze, Due Diligence and Potential Liabilities, in HOW TO
PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 2008, at 119, 128 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice,
Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1702, 2008).
61. See id. (“The determination of how much diligence is necessary or appropriate or what
constitutes a ‘reasonable investigation’ generally will vary depending on the specific facts and
circumstances.” (quoting Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (2006))).
62. See Douglas J. Schulz, Due Diligence: Securities Applications and Regulatory
Requirements, 2011, 17 PIABA B.J. 353, 357 (2010) (“[I]t’s not uncommon for a private
placement memorandum (PPM) or prospectus to state that the general partner or investment
advisor will conduct ‘due diligence’ as to any investments made.”).
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“calculat[ing] whether [a] debt or equity offering will cause [a]
company to violate financial covenants in the company’s financing
63
documents.” Although a wide array of possible due-diligence
measures exists, “[it] is difficult to establish a uniform set of due
diligence procedures for all transactions. . . . Steps that are
64
appropriate for one offering may not be appropriate for another.” In
the financial-services industry, this lack of uniformity leads to
uncertainty regarding what specific duties of due diligence investment
65
advisers owe their clients.
66
Given the lack of transparency in the financial-services market,
investment advisers sometimes fail either to perform the basic level of
due diligence or to disclose negative results to clients. For instance, in
the aftermath of the Madoff scandal, some clients sued financial
institutions that had invested client funds with Madoff for breach of
67
contract and failure to perform due diligence. Nevertheless, clients
usually cannot identify potential claims against financial institutions
until after the damage has been done—largely because of the lack of
68
transparency and the reactionary nature of the regulatory system.

63. Valerie Ford Jacob, The Due Diligence Process from the Underwriter’s Perspective, in
CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE IN M&A AND SECURITIES OFFERINGS 2009, at 135, 146 (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1746, 2009) (describing the various
responsibilities of due diligence); see also Clarke & Firenze, supra note 60, at 131–33 (providing
another list of various aspects of due diligence for financial firms).
64. Clarke & Firenze, supra note 60, at 128.
65. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
66. See Michael Barr, Assistant Sec’y for Fin. Insts., U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks
at the Financial Times Global Finance Forum on “Reforming the Global Financial System”
(Feb. 12, 2010), available at http://www.mondovisione.com/media-and-resources/news/assistantus-treasury-secretary-for-financial-institutions-michael-barr-remarks- (“The financial sector,
under the guise of innovation, piled ill-considered risk upon risk. The lack of transparency hid
the growing wedge in incentives facing different players in the system.”).
67. See Sanford P. Dumain, The Madoff Fraud: A Plaintiffs’ Lawyer’s Perspective, in
RESPONSE TO PONZI AND OTHER SCHEMES: ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUNDS UNDER
SCRUTINY, 43, 48 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbooks Ser. No. 1758, 2009)
(“There have been numerous complaints filed alleging that defendants breached their fiduciary
duty by not conducting sufficient due diligence or in failing to exercise reasonable care in
connection with their clients’ investments. . . . Investors may be able to sue their investment
advisers and/or other third parties on the basis of breach of contract.”). Professor Dumain
further elaborates that claims may arise under unjust enrichment, common-law fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and other causes of action. Id. at 48–49.
68. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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C. Silence—Not Disclosure—Appears To Be the Governing Principle
Even when adequate due diligence has been performed, case law
sets a low threshold for disclosing results to clients by punishing only
69
Because usually only
misstatements of material fact.
misstatements—not omissions—give rise to liability, investment
advisers and broker-dealers often remain silent about the benefits
and detriments of potential third-party investments. Cases such as
70
71
Van Alstyne, Noel & Co. and Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.
show that, because the regulatory system focuses on active
misstatements and does not adequately define affirmative duties,
forwarding market professionals often remain silent about negative
72
aspects of potential third-party investments to avoid liability. As the
Supreme Court has said, “Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not
73
misleading . . . .”
For instance, in Van Alstyne, the SEC sanctioned a broker-dealer
for making positive statements about a potential investment when he
possessed material nonpublic information revealing negative
74
attributes about the company. Although the undisclosed information
had been confidential, the SEC ruled that Van Alstyne, the brokerdealer, should not have made any statements concerning the company
in question because once the firm had volunteered positive
75
information, it should also have revealed negative information. The
ruling in Van Alstyne properly disciplined the particular market

69. See Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U.
L. REV. 75, 133–41 (2004) (outlining sources of fiduciary duties for financial institutions).
70. Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 4699, 33 S.E.C. 311 (Apr. 8,
1952).
71. Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968).
72. Many forwarding market professionals have taken further steps to protect themselves
by establishing “Chinese walls,” or barriers to the flow of nonpublic information within the firm.
Laby, supra note 69, at 139–40. Even though these Chinese walls may promote compliance with
duties of loyalty, they can also work against clients’ best interests because “the institution would
not be using all information that it had received to the benefit of a particular customer.” Tender
Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6239, Exchange Act Release No. 17,120, Investment
Company Act Release No. 11,336, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,415 (Sept. 12, 1980).
73. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1987); see also Laby, supra note 69, at
136–37 (“[W]hen upholding a duty of loyalty to one person (preserving confidentiality), one
may not breach a duty of loyalty (affirmative misstatements) to another. . . . If questioned on a
matter about which one has confidential information, one must remain silent. If the truth calls
for breaching confidentiality, the only option is to say nothing at all.”).
74. Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 4699, 33 S.E.C. at 312–17.
75. Id. at 321.
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professional in question, but its logic may lead to two problems in
practice. First, Van Alstyne’s reasoning incentivizes silence in the first
instance to avoid incurring a duty of full disclosure; second, it fails to
define what specific due-diligence obligations financial institutions
owe their clients in the context of third-party investments.
Similarly, the fiduciary standard nominally addresses the
continued monitoring of third-party investments, but it does so
weakly because it focuses only on active misstatements. In Black, a
financial institution was found liable for fraud because it had made
positive statements concerning a potential investment even though a
partner on the company’s board later discovered the investment was
77
faltering. Although the partner had not initially known his
statements were false, he had “permitted them to stand after he
78
learned the truth and before respondents relied on them.” The court
concluded that the partner had a duty to correct his earlier,
79
innocently made misstatement. Although the court properly
described the partner’s duty to disclose material postinvestment
information, it did not provide any guidelines for an affirmative duty
to perform postinvestment monitoring. Rather, it focused on the duty
to disclose once relevant postinvestment information has been
discovered.
The elaborations found in statutes, regulations, and case law of
the fiduciary duties that forwarding market professionals owe clients
for third-party investments do not adequately protect clients. The
existing framework fails to define the affirmative duties forwarding
market professionals owe their clients in the context of third-party
investments and sets a weak regulatory standard by focusing on active
misstatements. Broker-dealers and investment advisers, aware that
partial disclosure creates a duty to disclose fully all aspects of a
80
prospective investment, often remain silent to limit their liability.
Additionally, although these financial institutions have a duty to
disclose material facts that they discover in the postinvestment
context, case law does not impose an affirmative duty to perform
76. Id. at 312–17.
77. Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 157, 158–59 (Ct. App. 1968).
78. Id. at 159–60.
79. See id. at 162 (holding the defendant liable for not correcting his misstatement).
80. In the context of Van Alstyne, Professor Arthur Laby elaborates, “[O]nce the broker
released positive information about the company, it had a duty to disclose negative information
as well. The firm should have simply refrained from making statements regarding the company’s
prospects.” Laby, supra note 69, at 134–135.
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postinvestment monitoring of investments. Clients would benefit
greatly from the establishment of a concrete affirmative duty for
financial institutions to perform postinvestment monitoring when
81
client funds are handled by third parties.
II. ESTABLISHING A FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY LAW
Demonstrating the need for more clearly specified fiduciary
duties in the financial-services industry constitutes only the first step
toward remedying the problems created by the framework of the 1934
82
Act and the IAA. This Part II argues that although scholars and
regulators have overlooked agency law as a potential source for
defining forwarding market professionals’ fiduciary duties, agency
principles are nonetheless applicable to the financial-services context.
Section A describes how agency relationships often arise between
forwarding market professionals and their clients. Section B describes
the relevance of agency law to the financial-services industry and
argues that agency law has the potential to resolve common criticisms
against expanding the fiduciary duties of broker-dealers and
investment advisers.
A. Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers Often Establish Agency
Relationships with Their Clients
Independent of the regulatory framework established by the
1934 Act and the IAA, forwarding market professionals often form
agency relationships with their clients when they invest client funds
with third parties. Under agency law, a fiduciary relationship “arises
when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person
(an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and
subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or
83
otherwise consents so to act.” Contractual terms or industry norms
do not determine the existence of an agency relationship; rather, an

81. See infra notes 173–80 and accompanying text.
82. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943) (“But to say that a man is a
fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary?
What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these
obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?”).
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).

ISAKOFF IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1578

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/19/2012 11:48 PM

[Vol. 61:1563

agency relationship is determined by mutual assent between an agent
84
and a principal.
Because agency law focuses on the mutual assent of a principal
and an agent, rather than on distinctions regarding whether advice
85
was “solely incidental” to transactional services, attention should be
given to the reasonable expectations of both the client and the
forwarding market professional. Financial institutions and their
clients, in actions if not in words, often consent to an agency
relationship that mandates continued monitoring and due diligence.
Clients, for their part, expect a fiduciary relationship and assent to an
interaction in which broker-dealers and investment advisers will guide
them through the investment process as their financial agents. A poll
of 1,319 clients of financial institutions revealed that “[m]any of them
[were] wrong in their belief that . . . broker-dealers . . . are currently
86
held to a fiduciary standard.” Moreover, broker-dealers often
embrace this misconception by marketing themselves as financial
87
agents. Even though mutual assent to the consequent relationship
might not be explicit, a manifestation of assent does not necessarily
have to occur in writing under agency law, but rather can be derived
88
from words or actions. When a financial institution and its clients
mutually agree to enter a business relationship involving continuous
advice and monitoring of investments, they establish a broad agency
relationship.
Although agency law has not yet been applied to forwarding
market professionals’ investing activities with third parties, courts
have previously held that financial institutions can generally establish
agency relationships with their clients. For instance, in Merrill Lynch

84. See id. § 1.02 (“An agency relationship arises only when the elements stated in § 1.01
are present. Whether a relationship is characterized as agency in an agreement between parties
or in the context of industry or popular usage is not controlling.”); see also id. § 8.07 (“An agent
has a duty to act in accordance with the express and implied terms of any contract between the
agent and the principal.”).
85. See supra Part I.A.
86. Shepherd Smith Edwards & Kantas LTD LLP, Most Investors Want Fiduciary Standard
for Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, Say Trade Groups to SEC, STOCKBROKER FRAUD
BLOG (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.stockbrokerfraudblog.com/2010/10/most_investors_want_
fiduciary.html. In 2010, a number of trade organizations sent a letter to SEC Chairman Mary
Schapiro highlighting this survey of clients of financial institutions. Id.
87. See infra note 41.
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.03 (“A person manifests assent or
intention through written or spoken words or other conduct.”).
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89

Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cheng, the D.C. Circuit held that
Merrill Lynch had violated duties derived from its agency
90
relationship with Cheng, its client, by overpurchasing options in
91
violation of specific instructions from Cheng. Similarly, in Magnum
92
Corp. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., the Fifth Circuit found a
93
violation of a duty derived from an agency relationship when
Lehman Brothers purchased stocks on behalf of its clients despite
increases in the stock prices from the original prices quoted to the
94
clients.
Investment advisers often establish a broad agency relationship
with their clients because the parties mutually assent to a continuous
business
interaction
involving
discretionary
advice
and
95
postinvestment monitoring. For example, in IDS Bond Fund, Inc. v.
96
Gleacher NatWest, Inc., investment advisers were found to be agents
of their clients when they purchased $62 million in debt securities
issued by the defendant to fund the expansion of a foreign steel mill
97
for their clients’ accounts.
Broker-dealers require closer analysis. Broker-dealers, by
98
definition, act on behalf of their clients. Because both parties assent
to their roles, an agency relationship exists. Still, the scope of this
relationship may be narrower than that of investment advisers and
their clients because traditional broker-dealers generally provide only
99
transactional services as opposed to continuous advisory services. In

89. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cheng, 901 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
90. Id. at 1128 (“We hold that basic principles of agency law control here and that those
principles required Grace to inform the Chengs of their right to reject the unauthorized
options.”).
91. Id. at 1126.
92. Magnum Corp. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 794 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1986).
93. Id. at 200 (“The relationship between a securities broker and its customer is that of
principal and agent . . . .”).
94. Id. at 199.
95. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
96. IDS Bond Fund, Inc. v. Gleacher NatWest Inc., [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 91,471 (D. Minn. May 1, 2001).
97. See id. ¶ 96,827 (“The Investment Advisers were the agents for the Plaintiffs when it
made the decision to purchase and/or purchased the Notes on behalf of Plaintiffs.”).
98. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2006) (defining brokerdealers as persons “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account
of others”).
99. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
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Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., although
the court found an agency relationship between the broker-dealer
101
and its client, it also found that this relationship entailed no more
102
than the obligation “simply to buy and sell.” According to the
court’s description, the relationship ended when the transaction had
been completed: “The risk of the venture [was] upon the customer
103
who profit[ed] if it succeed[ed] and los[t] if it fail[ed].” Additionally,
104
as cases such as Walston & Co. v. Miller demonstrate, the agency
relationship between a broker-dealer and its clients can also extend
over a number of transactions, leading to further fiduciary duties
105
under agency law. In Walston, the client had hired a broker-dealer
to purchase and sell sugar contracts over a four-month period,
106
establishing an agency relationship for that term.
Thus, agency law often creates a strong fiduciary relationship
between forwarding market professionals and their clients—a
relationship that ought to shift the relevant analysis away from the
arbitrary distinctions of the regulatory system imposed by the 1934
Act and the IAA. Rather than adhering to a distinction between
broker-dealers and investment advisers, agency law creates a uniform
framework that establishes fiduciary duties for forwarding market
professionals whenever clients trust these financial institutions to act
on their behalf with regard to third-party investments.
B. The Relevance of Agency Law to the Financial-Services Industry
Regulators and academics have largely ignored the application of
107
agency law to financial institutions. In this regard, establishing an
100. Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 107, 110 (N.D.
Ala. 1971), aff’d, 453 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1972).
101. Id. at 111.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Walston & Co. v. Miller, 410 P.2d 658 (Ariz. 1966) (en banc).
105. Id. at 660 (describing an agency relationship between a broker-dealer and its client that
extended over a four-month period).
106. Id.
107. See Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor
and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1188 (2003) (“To many legal academics, agency law is
a backwater subject, long banished from the formal law school training except for brief
introductory reference in corporations or business associations.”). Some scholars have begun to
recognize the general application of agency law to the financial industry, although this concept
has not yet been applied to forwarding market professionals. See, e.g., Claire Moore Dickerson,
From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith, Fiduciary Duty & Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 955, 986 (1995) (“As an offshoot of the law of trusts, agency theory imposes this same
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agency framework for fiduciary duties represents a shift from the
deficient statutory distinction between broker-dealers and investment
108
advisers. The inattention to the relevance of agency law in this
context has forgone a potentially useful vehicle for describing the
fiduciary relationships that both broker-dealers and investment
109
advisers often establish with their clients. Agency law “permeates
110
an extraordinary amount of everyday law,” including many aspects
111
of business law. Moreover, the law of agency is malleable and
informed by decades of experience in a variety of settings; its
112
principles and holdings are well tested. This flexibility allows agency
law to avoid many of the criticisms that some scholars have expressed
concerning the expansion of fiduciary duties for forwarding market
professionals.
For instance, despite the arguments of some scholars that
113
contract law sufficiently protects clients, agency law presents a more
feasible safeguard for client funds invested with third parties.
Although clients could theoretically contract to ensure that
forwarding market professionals sufficiently perform due-diligence
procedures, “the transaction costs involved in drawing up a detailed
prior agreement covering all possible discretionary uses of power
over the life of the relation would not only be enormous, but also
114
would probably exceed the benefits of the proposed relation.” More
general documents that would limit transaction costs might fail to
unrelentingly high duty on the agent as fiduciary. The agency relationship is important because
it is a standard business form.” (footnote omitted)); Laby, supra note 18, at 414 (“If a broker
holds itself out as an adviser, and a customer responds by hiring the broker to act on her behalf,
this response triggers an agency relationship and a fiduciary obligation extending to matters
within the scope of the agency.”). But cf. Langevoort, supra at 1189 (“[A]gency law itself has not
systematically been evaluated to see whether, or how well, its black-letter rules fit when the
principal is an organization and the problem under consideration operates at agency’s shared
border with corporation law.”). See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, Suitability Claims and
Purchases of Unrecommended Securities: An Agency Theory of Broker-Dealer Liability, 37
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 535 (2005) (arguing that agency law could establish a fiduciary duty for brokerdealers to warn clients that an unrecommended purchase is unsuitable).
108. See supra notes 29–37 and accompanying text.
109. See Langevoort, supra note 107, at 1188 (“[I]ntellectual inattention to such a profound
area of private ordering is dangerous.”).
110. Id.
111. See id. (“[Agency law] appl[ies] anyplace that one person (the agent) agrees to act on
behalf of another (the principal) to carry out the principal’s affairs under the principal’s control.
It covers most employment relationships, and a good bit else.” (footnote omitted)).
112. See infra Part III.A.
113. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 813 (1983).
114. Id.
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provide the specificity needed to protect individual clients.
Conversely, a fiduciary duty arising from agency-law principles would
allow for a flexible framework that would avoid these transaction
costs yet still establish specific obligations supported by a substantial
body of case law.
Furthermore, although some cases have described how contract
116
law’s implied covenant of good faith protects clients, failure to
perform due diligence with respect to third-party investments is often
not consistent with the type of good-faith understanding envisioned in
117
such cases.
For instance, although some forwarding market
professionals, such as FGG, allegedly acted in bad faith by investing
client funds with Madoff despite actual or constructive knowledge of
his illegal activity, many others merely failed to perform adequate
118
due diligence and did not necessarily act in bad faith. As the
119
following Part of this Note describes, an agency framework would
establish affirmative duties of initial due diligence and postinvestment
monitoring independent of the duty of good faith.
Although some scholars contend that market mechanisms can
successfully regulate the financial-services industry and negate the
120
need for a heightened fiduciary duty, in practice, disparities in
information and industry sophistication between financial institutions
121
and their clients limit the application of such market mechanisms.
As was seen with the financial institutions that invested with Madoff,
clients largely do not raise due-diligence concerns when they are
122
enjoying steady profits. Clients of FGG, for example, did not begin

115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986) (noting that if the
negotiating parties “would have agreed to proscribe the act later complained of as a breach of
the implied covenant of good faith,” then the act indeed would have constituted such a breach).
117. See, e.g., Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 386–92 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding
agents liable for their failure to perform adequate due diligence even though the court implicitly
acknowledged that the agents did not act in bad faith). This case is discussed further in Part
III.A.
118. See supra notes 8–17 and accompanying text.
119. See infra Part III.
120. See Frankel, supra note 113, at 812 (“If the entrustor has the power to terminate the
fiduciary relation, the fiduciary may be deterred from abusing his power. Additionally, a
fiduciary competing in the market for employment may wish to please his entrustor in order to
enhance his reputation, to obtain more business, or to advance in the employee ranks.”).
121. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
122. See Graybow, supra note 14 (noting that investment adviser Merkin accepted $470
million in fees while investing with Madoff).
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to question their investments until the market collapsed in 2008.
Also, because market mechanisms correct relevant issues in an ex
post rather than an ex ante manner, they do little to protect client
funds before a loss is realized, as seen in the case of FGG. Agency
law, by contrast, outlines clear ex ante fiduciary duties that
forwarding market professionals owe their clients in the context of
third-party investments.
III. THE SPECIFIC DUTIES FORWARDING MARKET PROFESSIONALS
WOULD OWE THEIR CLIENTS FOR THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS
UNDER AGENCY LAW
This Part outlines the specific fiduciary duties that forwarding
market professionals would owe their clients according to an agency
framework and then considers how these duties would have applied
to particular cases in the financial-services industry. First, Section A
124
uses the Restatement (Third) of Agency and relevant case law to
elaborate on the specific duties that arise under agency law as applied
to forwarding market professionals. Although agency law has not yet
been applied to broker-dealers and investment advisers engaging in
125
third-party investments,
analogous agency cases in various
commercial contexts illuminate relevant principles. Next, Section B
examines events in the financial-services industry, such as the Madoff
investment scandal, and highlights how fiduciary duties arising from
agency law could have been applied to these broker-dealers and
investment advisers. As examples from the financial-services industry
show, agency law could be used effectively to define clear fiduciary
duties for forwarding market professionals with respect to client
funds handled by third parties. Finally, Section C explains how a
regulatory framework for forwarding market professionals based on
agency principles could be implemented under the Dodd-Frank Act.

123. See Healy, supra note 9 (“More recently, as the 2008 stock market collapse gathered
steam, Fairfield clients pressured the firm to explain Madoff’s operation and strategy. The
executives could not answer many of these questions, and acknowledged in internal e-mails the
gaps in their knowledge. Yet, according to Galvin’s complaint and prehearing memorandum,
they continued to assure customers they had done ample due diligence.”); see also Frankel,
supra note 113, at 812–13 (“[T]he power to terminate is an ineffective safeguard unless the
entrustor can discover the abuse of power and the fiduciary knows he is subject to scrutiny.”).
124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (2006).
125. See supra Part II.
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A. Agency Law’s Exacting Standard
Agency law provides a framework of clearly defined duties that
could be applied to broker-dealers and investment advisers that they
invest client funds with third parties. Fiduciary duties based on
agency law would include duties of care, competence, diligence, and
good conduct on the part of the fiduciary to maximize the value of its
126
clients’ property. Cases applying agency law illustrate that when
these forwarding market professionals perform initial due diligence
and postinvestment monitoring of third-party investments, they
should use all reasonably available resources to investigate the third
127
party. Broker-dealers and investment advisers should review all
relevant documents, perform additional due diligence for the
potential investment, investigate any areas of concern, and ensure
that the transaction meets regulatory requirements. After performing
this high level of due diligence, financial institutions should then be
required to disclose all material facts to their clients. Additionally,
broker-dealers and investment advisers would have an obligation
under agency law to perform postinvestment monitoring of the third
parties. As agents who claim “to possess special skills or
128
knowledge,” broker-dealers and investment advisers should use the
full breadth of these skills to represent their clients’ interests by
thoroughly investigating potential third-party investments.
First, agency law would require that forwarding market
professionals review all relevant documents concerning third-party
investments for potential problems that might warrant further
investigation. For instance, in Steed Finance LDC v. Nomura
129
Securities International, Inc., Steed hired AMRESCO Advisors, Inc.

126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (“An agent has a fiduciary duty to act
loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.”); see
also id. § 8.08 (“Subject to any agreement with the principal, an agent has a duty to the principal
to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents in similar
circumstances. Special skills or knowledge possessed by an agent are circumstances to be taken
into account in determining whether the agent acted with due care and diligence. If an agent
claims to possess special skills or knowledge, the agent has a duty to the principal to act with the
care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents with such skills or knowledge.”);
id. § 8.10 (“An agent has a duty, within the scope of the agency relationship, to act reasonably
and to refrain from conduct that is likely to damage the principal’s enterprise.”).
127. See id. § 8.08 (describing the specific duties an agent owes to a principal); see also supra
note 63 and accompanying text.
128. Id. § 8.08.
129. Steed Fin. LDC v. Nomura Sec. Int’l, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 8058(NRB), 2004 WL 2072536
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2004).
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130

as its agent to perform due diligence on a potential investment in
131
subordinate commercial mortgage pass-through certificates. Steed
claimed that the defendants, the sellers of the certificates, had made
132
misleading statements about the investment, but the defendants
ultimately proved that they had made full disclosures to AMRESCO,
which had failed to perform its due diligence by not adequately
133
reviewing those disclosures. Though AMRESCO’s due-diligence
team leader claimed that he had never seen the relevant litigation
134
disclosures, the court found that AMRESCO had indeed received
these documents and that, by not reviewing the documents,
AMRESCO had failed to meet its duty of due diligence under agency
135
law. In this case, review of the disclosures would have revealed the
potential concerns that sophisticated market professionals should
136
have noticed.
Next, agency law would require further due-diligence measures
beyond mere document review. Such measures might entail
investigating references for a potential investment and meeting with
relevant officers of the third-party company. For instance, in In re
137
Rich, the defendant, “an accountant and former managing partner
138
of J. Manning Winikus & Co.,” had a fiduciary duty because of his
139
140
agency relationship with his client, Ruth Wolfert. Wolfert had

130. See id. at *6 (specifically defining an agency relationship between AMRESCO and
Steed).
131. Id. at *1.
132. Id. at *3.
133. See id. at *4 (“Defendants assert that a Litigation Disclosure revealing all relevant
information was delivered directly to Steed and to its delegate, AMRESCO, whom Steed had
hired to conduct due diligence in connection with the D5 Trust, and thus that all information
which Steed claims was withheld was disclosed and, accordingly, plaintiff was not misled.”).
134. See id. at *5 (“Larry Hicks, the head of AMRESCO’s due diligence team, stat[ed] that
he never saw the Litigation Disclosure (which was allegedly included in the Asset Summary
Report) and was not aware of its contents.”).
135. See id. at *6 (“[C]ontrary to Mr. Hicks’ recollection, the Asset Summary Report was
received by AMRESCO, who was acting as Steed’s agent to perform pre-purchase due
diligence . . . .” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
136. See id. at *7 (“The disclosures in the Asset Summary Report certainly contained
sufficient ‘red flags’ that a sophisticated investor should have realized that more due diligence
was warranted. In fact, even ordinary investors are not permitted to ignore obvious warning
signs.”).
137. In re Rich, 353 B.R. 796 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
138. Id. at 799.
139. Id. at 805–07.
140. Id. at 800.
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The
transferred $169,500 to the defendant for investment.
defendant invested his client’s funds in two investment schemes,
142
through which he lost substantial portions of the funds. Despite
claims to the contrary by the plaintiff—the executor of Wolfert’s
estate—the court ruled that the defendant had indeed performed
143
adequate due diligence. Critically, with the two investments, the
defendant had ensured the existence of the U.S. Treasury bonds that
were to be redeemed, had met with relevant officers, had performed a
criminal background check on one of the potential third-party
companies, had examined relevant financial statements, and had
144
contacted references. As this case demonstrates, only extensive due
diligence beyond initial document review would meet agency law’s
exacting fiduciary standard.
This heightened due-diligence standard would remedy the
ineffective and ambiguous requirements created by the statutory
145
framework of the 1934 Act and the IAA by imposing a more
stringent standard whenever a financial institution does not review
documents or obtain other readily available information that would
have revealed areas of concern for a potential third-party investment.
The need for such a heightened standard is exacerbated by the fact
that any weak requirements of due diligence under the system erected
by the 1934 Act and the IAA have largely been applied only to
investment advisers; broker-dealers have not faced similar
146
requirements.
The adoption of an agency framework would

141. Id.
142. Id. at 800–02.
143. Id. at 812. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this case
because the defendant’s due-diligence efforts created a question of fact as to whether he had
breached his agency relationship. Id.
144. See id. at 807–08 (“The Debtor claims that his due diligence consisted of: (i) confirming
the existence of the U.S. Treasury Bonds that would allegedly be redeemed; (ii) speaking
directly with a ‘person’ who George claimed to be an intermediary for the holders of the U.S.
Treasury Bonds; (iii) sending a business consultant to Europe to verify parts of George’s story;
(iv) checking police records as to George’s background; and (v) speaking to a director of a
Dreyfus mutual fund about George generally.”); id. at 810 (describing that, for the second
investment, “(i) [the defendant] inquired about Mintus at Citibank, where [he and the decedent]
both had accounts, and concluded that Citibank found her reliable; (ii) he contacted the
references provided by Mintus and was told that she was responsible and reliable; (iii) he met
with Mintus several times and brought a business associate with him; they both allegedly felt
that Mintus was sincere; and (iv) he examined records of Mintus’ prior investments, which
allegedly reflected enormous profits”).
145. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
146. See supra Part I.
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mandate a heightened duty of due diligence both for broker-dealers
and investment advisers operating in this context.
Furthermore, in the event that due diligence were to reveal any
areas of concern, agency law would require forwarding market
professionals to review those areas of concern through in-depth
investigation. Agency case law in the real-estate context elaborates on
147
148
this principle. In Easton v. Strassburger, real-estate brokers acted
149
as agents to inspect a house for a potential sale. Although the agents
had inspected the house prior to sale and had noticed potential
problems with the soil, they neglected to request soil tests and did not
150
inform their clients of the potential complications. Later, soil
151
erosion damaged the house, resulting in a loss of $213,000. When
the California Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s fraud claim
against the agents, it implicitly admitted that the agents had not acted
152
in bad faith.
Nevertheless, the court found them liable for
153
negligence because they had violated their “affirmative duty to
conduct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the
154
residential property listed for sale.”
Agency law would thus expand upon the due-diligence
requirements imposed by the 1934 Act and the IAA by establishing
155
negligence as the standard for fiduciary violations. As applied to the
financial-services industry, broker-dealers and investment advisers
would be required to investigate of any possible concerns that
reasonable market professionals would have noticed in a potential
third-party investment. Even negligent ignorance of concerns

147. See Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 391–92 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding a realestate broker liable for failing to investigate potential soil problems that later caused massive
property damage).
148. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1984).
149. See id. at 385–86 (“Appellant was represented in the sale of the property by its agents
Simkin and Mourning.”).
150. See id. at 386 (“There is also evidence they were aware of certain ‘red flags’ which
should have indicated to them that there were soil problems. Despite this, the agents did not
request that the soil stability of the property be tested and did not inform respondent that there
were potential soil problems.”).
151. Id. at 385.
152. See id. at 387 (“As noted, however, appellant’s liability was here grounded on
negligence rather than fraud.”).
153. Id. at 397.
154. Id. at 390 (footnote omitted).
155. See id. at 387 (“We are concerned here only with the elements of a simple negligence
action . . . .”).
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warranting investigation would establish liability under agency law.
Under the existing regulatory system, courts have sometimes looked
157
to whether financial institutions have acted in good faith; agency
law would provide a more exacting standard that would hold financial
institutions liable for negligent failure to perform due diligence
regardless of their good faith.
Additionally, agency law would require forwarding market
professionals to ensure that potential transactions meet all regulatory
requirements. AFA Private Equity Fund 1 v. Miresco Investment
158
Services provides an analogous case to illustrate this point. In that
case, the plaintiff had purchased 73,600 shares of Series B preferred
159
stock for $1 million in Miresco, a wholesale distributor of area rugs.
The plaintiff utilized broker-dealer Sanders Morris Harris (SMH) as
160
the placement agent for the transaction, and the stock purchase
agreement explicitly stated that “SMH was to act as an agent for
161
Plaintiff and other investors.” In that capacity, “SMH was to assure
that all documents and instruments incident to the stock transaction
162
were satisfactory in substance and form.” Although the court found
that SMH had aptly performed due diligence to find irregularities in
Miresco’s financial statements and had disclosed the results to the
163
plaintiff, the court denied SMH’s motion to dismiss, given evidence
that its due diligence had failed to discover that the transaction was
164
potentially an unregistered sale of securities. As applied to financial
institutions, this case expands conceptions of fiduciary duties by
supporting the proposition that broker-dealers and investment

156. See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
158. AFA Private Equity Fund 1 v. Miresco Inv. Servs., No. 02-74650, 2005 WL 2417116
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2005).
159. Id. at *1.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *10.
162. Id. The agreement further stated “that SMH would conduct a due-diligence
investigation and inform Plaintiff whether, in its good faith judgment, there were any material
facts that would make the investment inadvisable, and that SMH would assure that the business,
assets, financial condition, and operations of Miresco were substantially as represented to
SMH.” Id.
163. See id. at *2 (“Sometime in June, 2002, SMH representatives informed Plaintiff that
there were accounting irregularities relating to the financial position of Miresco.”).
164. See id. at *9 (“SMH must present evidence showing that the securities at issue here are
exempt from registration under the rules adopted by the SEC under § 4(2).”). The court ruled
against SMH’s motion to dismiss. Id. at *12.
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advisers should investigate whether an investment comports with
relevant regulations.
After performing due diligence, broker-dealers and investment
advisers should disclose all material facts concerning potential third165
party investments. An agency-law framework for disclosure of
material facts to clients would eliminate the option of silence that
often occurs under the framework created by the 1934 Act and the
166
IAA and would encourage the free flow of information from
167
financial institutions to their clients. For example, in Thomas &
168
Wong, General Contractor, Inc. v. Wallace, the plaintiffs employed
Wallace as an agent to negotiate their investment in BDV, a company
that “intended to finance various business operations, including a
169
mobile checkcashing business.” Thomas & Wong requested that
170
Wallace complete a specific due-diligence list. Wallace failed to
disclose material facts regarding the investment, and BDV
171
subsequently defaulted on the loan. The court denied Wallace’s

165. See, e.g., Thomas & Wong, Gen. Contractor, Inc. v. Wallace, No. 1 CA-CV 08-0634,
2010 WL 475690, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2010) (holding an agent responsible for
withholding material facts related to the results of due diligence in a particular transaction).
166. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
167. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (2006) (“An agent has a duty to use
reasonable effort to provide the principal with facts that the agent knows, has reason to know,
or should know when (1) subject to any manifestation by the principal, the agent knows or has
reason to know that the principal would wish to have the facts or the facts are material to the
agent’s duties to the principal; and (2) the facts can be provided to the principal without
violating a superior duty owed by the agent to another person.”).
168. Thomas & Wong, Gen. Contractor, Inc. v. Wallace, No. 1 CA-CV 08-0634, 2010 WL
475690 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2010).
169. Id. at *1.
170. See id. at *2 (“Before funding the loan, Tarapaski wanted the due-diligence checklist
completed; in particular, he wanted to confirm the existence of the gold doré collateral and
ensure that both the certificate of insurance for the gold and the safekeeping receipt that
prohibited the gold from being moved without consent had been assigned to Thomas & Wong.
Wallace agreed to attend a gold viewing to confirm the existence of the gold on behalf of
Thomas & Wong, and assured Tarapaski that the certificate of insurance and the safekeeping
receipt had been assigned to Thomas & Wong.”).
171. See id. (“Unbeknownst to Tarapaski, six days earlier, on March 6, 2007, Wallace
instructed Cane O’Neill to release $275,000 to a company called L Trust, for the purchase of the
Minneapolis condominium; Wallace never disclosed this fact to Tarapaski. On March 21, 2007,
Wallace authorized an additional $20,000 disbursement to L Trust, without Tarapaski’s
knowledge, for reasons she could not explain. Further, despite agreeing to do so, Wallace never
personally viewed the gold to confirm its existence.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at *3
(“Despite repeated assurances that the primary loan would fund, it never closed and BDV
defaulted on its obligation to Thomas & Wong.”). The court further elaborated on Wallace’s
deficient due diligence and subsequent disclosure by explaining that
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motion for judgment as a matter of law, supporting the notion that
under agency law, agents must disclose all known material facts
regarding potential investments as part of their duty of due diligence.
Unlike the regulatory framework created by the 1934 Act and the
IAA, agency law would emphasize that silence concerning material
173
facts does not mitigate liability.
Finally, under agency principles, broker-dealers and investment
advisers would owe their clients a continuous duty to monitor
investments, even after the initial transaction. For instance, in SCF
174
Arizona v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., Wachovia had explicitly become
175
an agent of SCF through an investment contract. Wachovia had
subsequently purchased $25 million of bonds issued by Lehman
176
Brothers Holdings with its client’s funds. Although the housing
bubble made this a strong investment at the time, SCF alleged that
because the housing bubble burst in late 2007, Wachovia either
should have withdrawn these funds as part of its duties to monitor
continuously the investment of SCF funds or should have warned
177
SCF of this new risk. SCF provided evidence that, even as late as
[a]lthough Wallace initially told Tarapaski that the gold had been sent to Salt Lake
City to melt for sale, and then claimed that $12 million had been realized from the
sale, Tarapaski ultimately learned that the gold had never been melted or sold. In
Tarapaski’s subsequent personal attempt to track and seize the gold, he found
containers with what appeared to be gold concentrate; but tests later revealed that the
material in the containers was worthless.
Id. at 3.
172. See id. at *9 (“The record reflects sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Wallace
breached this duty to Thomas & Wong by failing to disclose material information.”).
173. See id. (describing Wallace’s silence concerning material facts); see also In re Swartz,
630 P.2d 1020, 1026 (Ariz. 1981) (en banc) (“As an agent with fiduciary duties to his coinvestors, respondent owed them the obligation of fully disclosing all material facts concerning
the sale of the Denny Ranch.”).
174. SCF Ariz. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 09 Civ. 9513(WHP), 2010 WL 5422505
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010).
175. See id. at *1 (“Paragraph 1 of the Agreement, titled ‘Creation of Agency Relationship,’
provided that SCF ‘hereby authorizes [Wachovia] to act as its Agent in arranging for loans of
securities of [SCF] currently in the possession or control of First Interstate Bank of Arizona
(‘Bank’) in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement.’” (alterations in
original)).
176. Id. at *2.
177. See id. at *3 (“As the ‘housing bubble’ began to burst in late 2007, SCF alleges that it
became ‘apparent that investment banks and other institutions which had bet heavily on the
housing market by investing in mortgage-backed securities might sustain severe losses.’”
(quoting First Amended Complaint at 12, SCF Ariz., No. 09 Civ. 9513(WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
14, 2010))); id. at *5 (“Rather than challenging Wachovia’s decision to invest in Lehman bonds,
SCF claims that Wachovia breached the contract months later in failing to ‘maintain’ and
‘protect’ the collateral by selling the Lehman bonds or advising it of the increased risk.”).
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the summer of 2008, Wachovia could have sold the bonds without
178
incurring substantial losses. Despite this opportunity, Wachovia had
failed to withdraw the funds, and after Lehman filed for bankruptcy,
179
the bonds lost almost their entire value. SCF had specifically
invested its funds with Wachovia and had authorized Wachovia as its
agent because of SCF’s lack of sophisticated knowledge and
180
Wachovia’s purported market expertise.
The court denied
Wachovia’s motion to dismiss the claim for breach of fiduciary duty,
relying on evidence that Wachovia “[had known], or should have
known, about the increased risk of its Lehman investment beginning
181
in the spring of 2008.”
Thus, under an agency regime, forwarding market professionals
would face a continuous duty to use reasonable diligence in
monitoring the postinvestment status of client funds. Forwarding
market professionals would be required to monitor both the specific
182
investment and the market surrounding the investment. Rather than
premising liability only on active misstatements, and rather than
adopting the weak monitoring standard exemplified by cases such as
183
Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co, agency law would provide a
concrete affirmative duty of postinvestment monitoring for financial
institutions when they invest client funds with third parties.
Additionally, because broker-dealers do not face a duty of

178. See id. at *3 (“While the Lehman bonds were not trading at par in the spring and
summer of 2008, their market value was sufficiently high that Wachovia could have sold them
without incurring substantial losses.”).
179. Id.
180. Id. at *2 (“SCF alleges that because it lacked knowledge and sophistication with regard
to securities lending transactions, it ‘relied exclusively on Wachovia’s expertise, integrity and
professional judgment’ to administer the securities lending program and to perform its duties as
agent ‘in the best economic interests of SCF.’” (quoting First Amended Complaint, supra note
177, at 7)).
181. Id. at *9, *11.
182. Postinvestment due diligence would entail similar measures as due diligence in the
initial investment context. In addition to having to monitor the specific investment, forwarding
market professionals would also be required to maintain diligent awareness of the overall
performance of the market for the investment. See, e.g., id. at *3 (“While SCF acknowledges
that the Lehman investment was ‘initially a suitable one,’ it claims that the collapse of Bear
Stearns & Co. (‘Bear Stearns’) and other ‘significant market indications’ in 2008 should have
alerted Wachovia that the Lehman investment ‘might no longer be’ safe. According to the
Complaint, the Bear Stearns collapse indicated that similar ‘weaknesses . . . might affect other
banks, including Lehman,’ and that the market no longer viewed Lehman bonds as a low-risk
investment.” (omission in original) (citations omitted) (quoting First Amended Complaint,
supra note 177, at 13)).
183. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.
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postinvestment monitoring under the regulatory system created by
184
an agency framework would
the 1934 Act and the IAA,
appropriately heighten broker-dealers’ duties to their clients in the
context of third-party investments.
As case law demonstrates, agency law would provide wellarticulated fiduciary duties for forwarding market professionals.
Broker-dealers and investment advisers, when acting as their clients’
agents, would be required to review all relevant documents
concerning potential third-party investments. In addition to this
preliminary requirement, they would have to perform further due
diligence, such as meeting with relevant officers and investigating
recommendations for potential investments. Financial institutions
would then need to then investigate any potential concerns that a
reasonable market professional would have noticed. Moreover, under
an agency framework, forwarding market professionals would have to
ensure that the transaction complies with relevant regulations. These
financial institutions would then be required to disclose to clients
relevant facts discovered during due-diligence investigations. Lastly,
duties of forwarding market professionals under agency law would
extend past an initial investment and include an affirmative duty of
postinvestment monitoring.
B. Examples of Breaches of Due Diligence and Postinvestment
Monitoring Duties by Forwarding Market Professionals
When broker-dealers and investment advisers considered placing
client funds with Madoff, the due diligence required under an agencylaw framework would have brought to their attention numerous
concerns about Madoff’s purported investment strategy. As early as
1999, some financial experts, such as Harry Markopolos, began to
185
suspect that Madoff was engaging in illegal activity.
After
performing due diligence, Markopolos concluded that Madoff’s
operations merited serious investigation; he submitted a full report to
186
the SEC in 2005.

184. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
185. Craig M. Douglas, Madoff Had Early Skeptic in Boston Gumshoe, BOS. BUS. J. (Dec.
16, 2008, 1:15 PM EST), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2008/12/15/daily23.html.
186. Justin Fox, Harry Markopolos Really Did Have the Goods on Bernie Madoff, TIME
(Dec. 18, 2008), http://business.time.com/2008/12/18/harry-markopolos-really-did-have-thegoods-on-bernie-madoff.
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Many financial institutions that invested in Madoff’s scheme
failed to meet agency law’s basic requirements of reviewing relevant
documents to determine whether any potential concerns existed;
187
others recklessly disregarded Madoff’s dubious activity. Before
public discovery of Madoff’s fraud, hedge fund manager Merkin was
suspicious of Madoff and was warned by two trusted colleagues that
this investment was “too good to be true” and might be a Ponzi
188
scheme. Under an agency framework, even negligent inattention to
these concerns when reasonable due diligence would have discovered
them would result in a breach of the duties arising from an agency
189
relationship. At best, financial advisers such as Merkin were
negligent in the performance of due diligence and would have faced
liability under relevant agency law.
Not long after the collapse of Madoff’s fund, Irving Picard, the
court-appointed liquidating trustee of Madoff’s firm, filed suit against
numerous forwarding brokers who had invested with Madoff for
ignoring suspicious signs from Madoff’s operations and for failing to
190
engage in postinvestment monitoring of the investments. One of the
most prominent of these suits was the case against JPMorgan Chase
& Co. (JPMorgan), who Picard alleged had gained $1 billion in fees
for investments with Madoff despite having been “willfully blind”
191
toward Madoff’s nefarious activities. JPMorgan “admitted in the
months before Madoff’s arrest that . . . returns had been too good—
especially in down markets—to [have been] believable, but for years

187. See Jim Zarroli, Madoff’s Victims May Still Have More To Lose, NPR (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/2010/12/13/132032517/madoff-s-victims-may-still-have-more-to-lose (“One
theory involves the so-called forwarding brokers or investment advisers who were
recommending to their clients that they invest their money with Madoff. Picard has alleged that
several of them were reckless in not being aware that Madoff was engaged in a huge Ponzi
scheme, or that they just turned a blind eye to it.” (quoting Professor James D. Cox)).
188. Graybow, supra note 14.
189. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006) (“[T]he agent has a duty to the
principal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents with such
skills or knowledge.”).
190. See Amended Complaint (Redacted), Sec. Inv. Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff
Inv. Sec. LLC, No.1:11-cv-00913 (CM) (MHD) (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2011) 2011 WL 2551979.
191. See Colin Barr, JPMorgan and Madoff: Tighter than You Thought?, CNN MONEY
(Dec. 2, 2010, 2:50 PM ET), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2010/12/02/jpmorgan-and-madofftighter-than-you-thought (“JP Morgan was willfully blind to the fraud, even after learning about
numerous red flags surrounding Madoff. . . . While many financial institutions enabled Madoff’s
fraud, JPMC was at the very center of that fraud, and thoroughly complicit in it.” (quoting
David J. Sheehan, counsel for the trustee) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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they pretended that was not the case.” Even if JPMorgan was not
immediately aware of Madoff’s fraudulent activity when it first
invested in Madoff’s scheme, the subsequent—and suspiciously
steady—returns of 10 percent to 12 percent should have prompted
193
some skepticism. Under agency case law, JPMorgan would have
been liable for failing to perform its duty of postinvestment
194
monitoring. If the questionably steady profit flow had become a
concern after initial investment, JPMorgan would have been required
to investigate this issue further as part of its postinvestment
monitoring duties under agency law.
Madoff constructed a fraudulent scheme rife with warning
signals, many of which reasonable financial institutions should have
noticed. The due diligence requirement under an agency framework
would have compelled these financial institutions to discover the
suspicious nature of Madoff’s investment plan. Although the
consistent 10 percent to 12 percent returns on investments that
195
Madoff offered were “within the realm of possibility, if just barely,”
financial institutions that performed adequate due diligence would
likely have realized that, in the words of one journalist, “consistency
196
at the highest level isn’t bad; it’s impossible.” Ultimately, “nothing
in which you are putting millions of dollars is so wonderful that it
197
cannot withstand scrutiny.” Agency law’s exacting framework
would protect clients from schemes such as Madoff’s by providing
clearly defined duties of due diligence and postinvestment monitoring
for forwarding market professionals.

192. Scott Shifrel, Madoff Trustee Sues Bank for Being ‘Blind,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 3,
2010, at 24 (omission in original) (quoting Deborah Renner, counsel for Irving Picard) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
193. See Paul Sullivan, The Rules That Madoff’s Investors Ignored, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/your-money/06wealth.html (“Mr. Madoff’s returns
were too good to be true, but no one wanted to believe that.”).
194. See, e.g., SCF Ariz. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 09 Civ. 9513(WHP), 2010 WL
5422505, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010) (describing the duty of postinvestment monitoring
under agency law).
195. Sullivan, supra note 193.
196. Id. Sullivan further elaborates that “[i]t defies logic that someone so well versed in a
market with as many unforeseeable glitches as baseball would believe that an equally imperfect
world—investing—could be so steady.” Id.
197. Id.
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C. Implementation Under the Dodd-Frank Act
Agency law would provide a strong framework for defining the
fiduciary duties that forwarding market professionals owe their
clients. Although a heightened regulatory structure might initially
increase transaction costs in the financial-services industry as
198
forwarding market professionals adapt to the new system, it also
would offer the best remedy for many of the problems highlighted by
199
the economic crisis of 2008 and its fallout. Although fiduciary duties
arising from agency law exist independent of statutory requirements,
the Dodd-Frank Act presents an apt opportunity to implement
200
agency principles in statutory form. An agency framework would
replace the antiquated distinction between broker-dealers and
investment advisers and would establish a fiduciary duty for
forwarding market professionals when both the forwarding market
professional and its clients manifest assent for the financial institution
to act on the client’s behalf with regard to third-party investments.
The specific contours of this fiduciary duty would reflect agency case
201
law in analogous commercial contexts.
Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act expressly authorizes the SEC to
establish a clearly defined fiduciary duty for broker-dealers and
202
investment advisers after a six-month study period. Congress did

198. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 275 (2010) (“But
when new forms are chosen because they reduce regulatory costs and increase transaction costs
compared to the old structure, we lose twice: efficiency is reduced by the increase in transaction
costs, and the regulatory burden is shifted onto those who cannot engage in arbitrage. Worse
yet, if everyone engages in the arbitrage, all we have done is increased transaction costs with no
net change in the incidence of the regulatory burden.”).
199. See supra Part II.B.
200. A statutory fiduciary duty, based on principles of agency law, for financial institutions
regarding funds handled by third parties would comport with the specific requirements of the
Dodd-Frank Act. For instance, Congress in that legislation has explicitly authorized the SEC to
establish a “best interest” standard for investment advice that broker-dealers and investment
advisers provide to clients. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L No. 111-203, § 913(g)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1829 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k) (Supp. IV
2010)). Although broker-dealers face a low “suitability” standard, the Dodd-Frank Act includes
statutory provisions that are meant to harmonize regulations of broker-dealers and investment
advisers, id., so the SEC could provide that broker-dealers have a continuing fiduciary duty of
postinvestment monitoring if both the broker-dealer and his client manifest assent to such a
relationship.
201. See supra Part III.A. As the cases cited in that Section indicate, a statutory framework
based on agency law would create a private cause of action.
202. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g), 124 Stat.
at 1828–29 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(k)–(l), 80b-11(g)–(h)) (amending the 1934 Act and the
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not require the SEC to provide a new statutory fiduciary duty for
financial institutions, but the SEC will likely use this opportunity in
203
204
some form. In January 2011, the SEC released a study, as required
205
by section 913(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Although the SEC study
does not explicitly recommend a fiduciary duty based on agency law,
the SEC’s study highlights the need for a “uniform fiduciary
standard” applicable to both broker-dealers and investment
206
advisers. In the study, the SEC specifically “recommends the
consideration of rulemakings that would apply expressly and
207
uniformly to both broker-dealers and investment advisers.” This
fiduciary standard would be “no less stringent than [the standard]
currently applied to investment advisers under Advisers Act Sections
208
206(1) and (2).” Applying agency-law standards to the forwarding
activities of broker-dealers and investment advisers would satisfy
these wishes.
At the beginning of 2012, the SEC had not yet implemented a
heightened fiduciary duty for forwarding market professionals
pursuant to the results of the January 2011 study. Still, many experts
have called for the SEC to use this provision of the Dodd-Frank Act
to establish a new regulatory framework for defining fiduciary duties
209
in the financial-services industry.
Significantly, Congressman
Barney Frank, coauthor of the Dodd-Frank Act, sent a letter to the
SEC requesting that it establish a new fiduciary framework for the
financial-services industry independent of the regulatory system

IAA to allow the SEC to provide new fiduciary duties for broker-dealers and investment
advisers).
203. SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, THE DODD-FRANK
ACT: COMMENTARY AND INSIGHTS 82 (2010), available at http://www.skadden.com/Cimages/
siteFile/Skadden_Insights_Special_Edition_Dodd-Frank_Act1.pdf.
204. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKERDEALERS: AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913
studyfinal.pdf.
205. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913(b), 124 Stat. at
1824–25 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o note).
206. Id. at vi.
207. Id. at v.
208. Id. at v–vi.
209. For example, “[a] petition signed by about 5,200 financial planners [was] delivered to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, urging it to impose a universal fiduciary duty on
anyone providing retail investment advice.” Mark Schoeff, Jr., Insurers Want Fiduciary Duty
Killed: Planners, INV. NEWS (June 26, 2011, 6:01 AM ET), http://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20110626/REG/306269971.
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210

created by the 1934 Act and the IAA. Critics of the January 2011
study noted that it did not provide a clear framework for establishing
a heightened fiduciary duty, and they argued that “[a] stronger
analytical and empirical foundation than provided by the Study
[should be] required before regulatory steps are taken that would
211
revamp how broker-dealers and investment advisers are regulated.”
As this Note demonstrates, agency law would provide such a
framework, informed by decades of case law. The agency-law
framework more clearly defines the fiduciary duties broker-dealers
and investment advisers owe their clients when they invest funds with
third parties.
CONCLUSION
The aftermath of the Madoff investment scandal highlighted the
need for regulatory reform in the financial-services industry.
Forwarding market professionals such as FGG and Merkin ignored
obvious warning signs about Madoff’s suspicious behavior and failed
to perform adequate due diligence before investing client funds with
212
Madoff. Independent of regulations under the 1934 Act and the
IAA, specific duties arise under agency law that would have
protected the clients of these financial institutions.
Regulations of forwarding market professionals based on the
1934 Act and the IAA do not provide sufficient safeguards for clients.
Under these regulations, broker-dealers face a mere suitability
standard as long as the investment advice provided is “solely
213
incidental” to brokerage services. Even when fiduciary duties do
arise for financial institutions, in practice, these obligations often

210. Letter from Rep. Barney Frank, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., to Mary
L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 30, 2011), available at http://media.advisor
one.com/advisorone/files/ckeditor/Barney%20Frank%20Letter.pdf (“If Congress intended the
SEC to simply copy the ‘40 Act and apply it to broker-dealers, it would have simply repealed
the broker-dealer exemption—an approach Congress considered but rejected. The new
standard contemplated by Congress is intended to recognize and appropriately adapt to the
differences between broker-dealers and registered investment advisors.”).
211. Statement, Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Comm’rs, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Statement Regarding Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (Jan. 21,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch012211klctap.htm.
212. See Graybow, supra note 14 (“The lawsuit against Merkin contends that at least two of
his trusted colleagues repeatedly told him Madoff’s returns were too good to be true—one
warning that Madoff’s money management business could be a Ponzi scheme, Cuomo said.”).
213. See supra Part I.B.
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214

promote silence rather than disclosure. Only material misstatements
are treated as clear violations of fiduciary duties, and withholding
negative information violates fiduciary obligations only after a
broker-dealer or investment adviser has already provided some
215
positive information on a potential investment with a third party.
Agency law would help establish a much-needed framework for
reform in the financial-services industry. Broker-dealers and
investment advisers often form an agency relationship with their
clients based on the mutual assent of both parties. Moreover, agency
case law provides a detailed analysis of specific fiduciary duties that
forwarding market professionals would owe their clients when they
invest funds with third parties. For instance, these financial
institutions would be required to review all relevant documents
concerning a potential third-party investment and also to perform
more extensive due-diligence procedures, such as meeting with
officers of the third party and performing a detailed background
check of the potential investment. Additionally, broker-dealers and
investment advisers would be required to investigate any causes for
concern that arise from a potential third-party investment and to
disclose these results to their clients. Lastly, under an agency-law
framework, forwarding market professionals would have a continued
duty of due diligence and postinvestment monitoring.
The Dodd-Frank Act presents an ideal opportunity to establish a
statutory fiduciary duty for forwarding market professionals based on
principles of agency law. Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act specifically
authorizes the SEC to define a new heightened fiduciary duty for
broker-dealers and investment advisers. Although the SEC has not
yet taken advantage of this opportunity, both industry experts and
politicians have called for a new framework of fiduciary duties
independent of the statutory requirements created by the 1934 Act
and the IAA. Agency law would provide this framework by clearly
outlining the specific duties forwarding market professionals owe
their clients for third-party investments.

214. See supra Part I.C.
215. E.g., Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 4699, 33 S.E.C. 311, 321
(Apr. 8, 1952).

